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Abstract 
Since 1991 massive restructuring and liberalization of agricultural marketing have been 
undertaken in Tanzania. The study examines this process in the context of SAP and the 
need to ensure a more economically viable private sector driven agricultural marketing 
system. Private firms and traders are increasingly marketing agricultural inputs and 
outputs, hitherto a preserve of marketing boards and cooperatives. The study uses 
interviews and a questionnaire to examine the impact of these changed on smallholder 
cashew producers, with special emphasis on the producers' views and expectations. We 
conclude that despite some financial and logistical problems, and vested interest, some 
positive results are discernible. Given favourable pricing, marketing and processing 
policies, the persistent decline in cashew production has been reversed, and producer 
prices have increased. The challenge is to develop a privatised and sustainable cashew 
marketing system that is responsive to producers' needs and expectations. 
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I. Introduction 
Public sector dominated agricultural economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), especially 
those like Tanzania, have taken a U-turn. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
with their market-determined prices and resource allocation, economic liberalization, 
and privatization have all addressed prevalent economic distortions and inefficiency. 
Exchange rate adjustments and reduced intermediary profits, for example, have increased 
agricultural producer prices to 60%-80% of world market prices. Additional agricultural 
reforms should improve efficiency in resource use, smallholder incomes and food security. 
The study examines the impact of macroeconomic changes and privatization on micro-
level cashewnut activities in Southeast Tanzania. We examine the privatization of cashew 
production, especially input supply and marketing through private sector channels, and 
smallholder welfare gains/losses. 
Various economic, investment, banking and financial liberalization changes and 
strategies have been introduced in the 1990s to create an enabling environment for public 
sector reform and privatization (Sarris and van der Brink, 1993; Ndulu et al., 1995). The 
Parastatal Sector Reform Commission's (PSRC) Parastatal Privatization and Reform 
Master Plan (1993) for parastatal divestiture is being implemented. The privatization of 
public sector cashew concerns affects the welfare of smallholder producers. 
The transformation of marketing boards into crop authorities in 1972/73, along with 
the dissolution of cooperative unions in 1976 and their reinstatement in 1984, ending 
both the compulsory single channel marketing system and uniform commodity pricing 
shook the crop production and marketing system. A number of cooperatives and 
agricultural parastatals collapsed. The procurement, processing and export of cashews 
by the crop authorities faced mammoth operating costs, excessive overheads and outright 
corruption. This put pressure on financial institutions, but also depressed producer prices. 
The study analyzes privatization effects on the cashew factor and product markets 
and the ensuing incomes and welfare of smallholder producers. The objectives of the 
study are to: 
a) Discuss privatization of the supply, stocking and distribution of cashew industry 
inputs and outputs and price effects. 
b) Examine income generation/poverty alleviation effects of (a) on smallholder producers. 
c) Examine wider policy implications and possible changes in light of (b). 
The study seeks to test the perceived superiority of the private over public sector 
cashew marketing approaches in terms of: 
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• Efficiency and cost effectiveness 
• Increased cashew production at an individual farmer level 
• Higher producer prices and increased welfare of cashew producers 
The study also examines whether these changes have rendered redundant the cost] y 
and duplicative public sector institutions and their activities. 
Primary data were gathered through interviews and a questionnaire in six major cashew 
growing districts: Newala, Lindi, Masasi, Tunduru, Nachingwea and Mtwara (Figure 1). 
Four villages were randomly sampled in each district. In each village, ten cashewnut 
farmers were randomly selected from a list availed by the Village Agricultural Extension 
Officer ("Bwana Shamba") and interviewed. Given the resource constraints, study 
coverage, theme and requisite precision, the sample of 240 cashew farmers was considered 
adequate. Data were also sourced from official and unofficial documents. The emphasis 
was on producer price differentials between public, and local and foreign private cashew 
marketing firms and traders. Secondary data allowed a time series decomposition of 
producer prices. The views of cashew producers, processors, marketers and other 
stakeholders are considered. 
Figure 1: Percentage annual cashew production by region/district 
II. Theoretical framework 
In Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, marketing boards sought price and income stabilization 
and agricultural development funds. But poor and inadequate marketing, transport and 
storage channels and facilities, and exploitation by "middlemen", characterized marketing 
board controls (Helleiner, 1966; Kriesel et al., 1970; Ellis, 1982; Temu, 1984). Private 
marketing channels, on the other hand, are more inclined to greater efficiency, supply 
responses and multiplier effects. Given doubtful economic benefits and lack of correlation 
between price stability and increased production, the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) 
(1966) considered abolishing price stabilization funds. The reorganization of the 
cooperatives in 1968 and marketing boards in 1972/73 tightened state control on 
agricultural marketing (Mwase et al. 1976). 
The creation of a market economy frees markets and energizes the forces of supply 
and demand. As Timmer (1986) noted, where the state, rather than the market, makes 
the allocative decision, prices reflect perceived social values and needs. Where prices 
deviate significantly from their scarcity values, there is discrepancy between short-term 
distribution and welfare concerns and long-term growth prospects calling for efficient 
use of scarce resources. Market liberalization therefore is targeted at narrowing the gap 
between set prices that reflect policy intervention objectives, and market-determined 
prices that reflect scarcity values. 
Economic liberalization may entail efficient state intervention. Agriculture is "public" 
in terms of policy and programme needs, but "private" in production, marketing and 
consumption decisions. Efficient management and intersectoral complementarity call 
for recognition of this dichotomy. Macro level interventions to address economic 
distortions should not put undue pressure on micro level decisions but rather canvass 
them for broader policy goals. Government can regulate and facilitate agricultural 
marketing to ensure fair trade and protection of public interest, for example by providing 
market information and improving market infrastructure and standardization, rather than 
monopolizing or competing in input supply, production, marketing, transportation, storage, 
processing or trading. 
Public enterprises pursue social objectives, which the free market would ignore. They 
suffer from political pressures, bureaucratic failure and lack of financial discipline, all of 
which result in poor performance in terms of output and financial outlay. On the other 
hand, privatization tends to be more conducive to competition and financial discipline, 
both leading to economic efficiency. The competition is often defective due to private 
monopoly, public and merit goods, externalities, and information problems (Layard and 
Walters, 1978:). However, the private sector option is viewed as superior in terms of 
tackling economic distortions and promoting economic growth. 
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The socioeconomic and political setting for smallholder agricultural production and 
marketing has changed significantly, largely because of the SAP policies: reduction of 
the budget deficit; removal of subsidies; and liberalization of agricultural input/output 
prices, public utility tariffs, and interest and exchange rates. Several significant 
devaluations over 1986-1995 depreciated the Tanzanian shilling from an average of 
Tsh.32 to US$1 in 1986 to Tsh.480 (1993) and Tsh.550 (1993). The shilling was floated 
in 1993, and has now stabilized at Tsh625=US$l. The corresponding parallel market 
rates were Tsh.165 and Tsh.515 in 1986 and 1992, denoting premium differences of 
404% and 7%, respectively. 
The nature, locus and effects of privatization of state-owned enterprises has been 
addressed by several writers (Roth, 1987; Von Braun and Kennedy, 1986; Ferron and 
Kenbur, 1990). Lofchie (1989) attributed Tanzania's poor agricultural performance lo 
over-valued exchange rates, inappropriate parastatal management and industrial strategies, 
and commodity pricing. "The pricing system", Lofchie (1989) argues, "represented 
such a strong economic disincentive to producers that this factor alone could well account 
for the drastic fall in the levels of marketed production of food grains and export crops". 
For cashew output, producer price remains the single most important variable. The 
price elasticities range from 0.12 for robusta coffee to 0.63 for cashewnuts (Mshomba, 
1989). 
III. Cashew production trends 
Cashewnut is Tanzania's third most important crop (after coffee and cotton), contributing 
10%-14% of foreign exchange earnings, which amounted to US$52 million in 1994/95. 
Grown largely in Mtwara and Lindi regions, cashewnut supports over 250,000 smallholder 
producers and factory workers. The average farmer has 1-2 hectares of cashewnuts 
sometimes intercropped with cassava and legumes especially in Mtwara and Nachingwea 
districts. Cashew production rose from 7,000 tons in 1945 to its highest peak of 145,080 
tons in 1973/74 (about 30% of world production), declining by 89% to 16,552 tons in 
1986/87 (about 7%-8% of global output). 
Following concerted efforts this decline was reversed in 1990/91 when production 
rose to 29,016 tons, recording further improvements to 41,657 tons (1991/92), but 
declining slightly to 39,323 tons in 1992/93. Production resumed its upward trend, 
registering 46,601 tons in 1993/94 and 70,000 tons in 1994/95 - 52% and 28% higher 
than 1993/94 actual and forecast production levels. Cashew production reached 81,000 
tons in 1995/96 (Table 1). Raw cashew exports at 46,598 tons in 1993/94 reached 70,000 
tons and 80,500 tons in 1994/95 and 1995/96, respectively. Cashew production is projected 
to increase by 10%—15% p.a. to about 100,000 tons by the year 2000. Cashew production 
by district is presented in Appendix A and its distribution by region/district is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 2 depicts production trends based on four-year averages. If cashew production 
had doubled to 250,000-300,000 tons (a plausible proposition given the resource base) 
the cashew industry could have absorbed the surplus labour, slowed rural-urban migration, 
and reduced Dar es Salaam's Wamachinga (street vendors who originate esssentially 
from Mtwara and Lindi regions) unemployment problem. 
Reasons for the production decline at a time of massive investment in processing 
plants include: 
• Forced relocation of cashew farmers into ujamaa villages (Operation Sogeza) and 
disincentives inherent in the "collectives". 
• Increased transport and storage costs leading to widespread abandonment of cashew 
trees in the bush. 
9 Cumbersome parastatal cashew marketing systems. 
• Declining cashew prices, from US$ 100 per ton in 1988/89, to US$725 (1992/93) 
and US$613 (1993/94) for standard grade. 
• Decreased real producer prices because of parastatal inefficiencies and payment 
delays. 
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9 Inaccessibility of credit facilities due to the 8-10 year loan payment lag. 
8 Widespread fungus disease and pests exacerbated by the bushy state of the farms, 
which reduced individual tree yields to 2-10%. 
• Ill-funded research and poor dissemination of research findings. R&D expenditure 
as a percentage of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development and 
national budget declined from 29% and 1.2% in 1987/88 to 25% and 0.6% in 
1992/93. 
8 The problem of "man-eating" lions in Tunduru. 
9 Poor crop husbandry. 
Cashew revival efforts led to the establishment in 1989 of the Cashewnut Improvement 
Programme (CIP) with donor financial and technical counterpart funds. The project 
ensured expanded infrastructure, extension services and intensified research in crop 
protection and disease resistant planting materials. CIP has encouraged rehabilitation, 
planting and sulphur dusting of high yield and disease-resistant cashew trees and enhanced 
accessibility to both remote district/villages and appropriate technology. (See Table 2 
for details of CIP.) 
Table 1: Production of cashewnuts in Tanzania (1945-1996) 
Year Production ('000 mt) Index 
(Peak of 73/74 is 100%) 
1965/66 
1970/71 
1973/74 
1976/96 
1980/81 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
7,000 
11,000 
23,000 
42,000 
73.327 
112,302 
145,080 
83,734 
56,658 
20,443 
16,552 
24.328 
19,375 
17,059 
29,186 
41,657 
39,323 
46,598 
70,000 
80,500 
5 
6 
16 
29 
51 
77 
100 
58 
39 
14 
11 
17 
14 
12 
20 
28 
27 
32 
48 
55 
Source: Market Development Bureau, Dar es Salaam. 
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Table 2: Cashew Improvement programme: Major performance indicators, June 1995 
Objectives Indicator Comments 
1. Increase cashew production 
2. Quality seeding supply and 
Survival 
3. Quality seed supply 
4. Farm gate price as % 
export price 
5. Secure imported inputs to 
meet demand 
6. Provide credit to farmers, 
traders and stockists 
7. Improve policies and 
procedures of small credit 
Production increase of. 
25% p.a 
•Supply 65% demand 
•Survival over 70% 
•Supply 60% of demand 
•Germination over 85% 
•65+% 
•Annual figure of imports. At 
least 50% of demand to be 
met 
•Significant number provided 
credit 
•Process and procedures of 
CRDB; impact on lending & 
recovery 
•At 70,000 tones, pro 
duction was 50% higher 
than forecasted 
•Unmet excess demand 
diverted to polyclonal 
seed 
•Met 
•Germination in Lindi 
poor (40%) 
•1993 & 1994 farm gate 
prices were 75 - 80% of 
export price 
•Region collected over 
Sh637m cashew ex 
ports levy of the input 
funds. 
•About 2,400 tones of in 
puts will be imported to 
meet about 60% de 
mand 
•CRDB unable to imple 
ment scheme in 1994/ 
95 due to BOT restricti 
ons 
•A restructured CRDB 
improved its lending 
procedures 
Source: Research by author. 
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Despite the elastic demand and price deterioration, prospects for cashews on the 
unsaturated world market remain good. However, India, the world's leading cashewnut 
producer/processor-and Tanzania's main export market-has switched to Southeast Asia 
and instituted in its eighth five-year plan (1995-2000) a comprehensive programme to 
increase its own cashewnut production to 600,000 tons to reduce imports. Given 
Tanzania's production shortfalls, Indian imports fell from peak levels of 175,000 tons in 
the early 1970s to 20-30,000 tons in the 1980s. If output and premium quality are 
restored, Tanzania can secure premium prices and ascertain external demand. 
IV. Cashew marketing and pricing 
Until 1991/92 cashews were marketed through a compulsory single channel system based 
on a two-tier monopolistic structure with a purchasing, processing and exporting parastatal 
at the helm and cooperatives at the base. Cashews were marketed through the National 
Agricultural Products Board (1963/64-1973/74) and by the Cashewnut Authority of 
Tanzania (CATA) (1973/74-1991/92). In the absence of cooperative unions over 1976/ 
77-1980/81, CATA dealt directly with primary cooperative societies and did production-
related work such as input supplies. In the early 1990s crop authorities, including CATA, 
reverted to marketing boards. 
Until lately cashew producers' main outlets were primary cooperative societies, which 
through the intermediary of second-tier cooperative unions sold to the Cashew Marketing 
Board, the main processor and exporter (Figure 2). However, unofficial channels existed 
with market determined prices subject to first channel constraints. This is consistent 
with observations by Helleiner (1966), Mwase et al. (1976), Ellis (1982), Temu (1984) 
and Jaffee (1994), who noted that agricultural producer price controls have not only 
been unworkable, but have generated illegal markets. The construction of 11 processing 
factories over 1974-1980 increased processing capacity by 465%, from 20,000 to 113,000 
tons, and permitted the export of decorticated nuts and cashewnut shell liquid (Appendix 
B). Only 10%—15% of the produce was locally consumed. 
With agricultural marketing privatized, the full-fledged Cashew Board of Tanzania 
(CBT), which issues export permits and leases factories, appears superfluous. However, 
primary cooperative societies, as purchase and storage depots for private traders and a 
link between smallholder producers and private input stocklists, still have a somewhat 
reduced role to play. 
Until 1973 government fixed into-store prices, hoping that cooperative unions/societies 
would pass on reasonable returns to producers. However, increasing costs and levies 
reduced residual producer prices. Appendix C shows a total of nine cashew levies imposed 
by district councils. In the past government fixed producer prices, net of cooperative/ 
parastatal marketing costs and crop levies. In the 1980s, faced with declining export 
commodity prices and increasing marketing costs, the government introduced export 
price subsidies to protect farmers. This meant income transfers from non-agricultural to 
agricultural sectors, and greater dependence on bank financing. 
The cashewnut pricing system has therefore passed through various phases: formally 
fixed into-store prices based on forecast export realization prices (1963/64-1974/75); 
fixed producer prices based on forecast export realization prices (1974/75-1989/90); 
and variable prices based on actual export realization prices (1990/91—). Under the pan-
1 0 
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Official cashew marketing channels prior to introduction of private marketing. 
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territorial producer pricing system, crop authorities and marketing boards met all approved 
cooperative costs, which effectively eliminated uniform into-store prices. However, 
despite structural, functional and institutional changes, the pricing system remained stable, 
albeit with significant refinement, until the early 1990s. Producer prices were calculated 
as a residual, after all cooperative/marketing board budgeted costs had been deducted 
from an assumed forecasted export price, with no accounting for inflation. 
Cashews face four different types of taxes: district cess, input, export and various 
fund levies especially for education. As Appendix C shows there were up to 10 district 
council levies/cesses. In 1994/95 in Lindi and Tunduru districts a total of Tsh63.00 and 
Tsh54.50 or 10% and 16% of average farm gate prices of a kilogramme of cashews were, 
respectively, payments for various levies and cesses. In 1994/95 CBT levies were as 
follows: registration license Tsh50,000 per district, export license 0.5% per tonne, exports 
levy 4% per tonne and stamp duty US$30 per tonne. The producer price as a percentage 
of export parity prices declined from 72% in 1970/71 to 24% in 1980/81. With prices 
determined once and held constant for a year, inflation generated windfall profits for 
CMB. Net profits for CMB before taxes were 28% to 47% over 1984/86-1988/89. 
The fulfillment of the board's objective of doing away with "exploitation by 
middlemen" did not benefit producers, to whom it is of no consequence whether the 
marketing intermediaries are public or private, CBT or indigenous/Asian traders, provided 
they minimize costs or maximize profits. Indeed, as Dumont (1969) noted, whereas it 
was plausible to protect farmers from the abuses of the Asian traders, "substituting for 
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them a new class of bureaucratic exploiters hardly seems an acceptable solution". Nor 
need there be undue worries about possible business concentration and dominance of 
cashew business by Asian traders given increased involvement by indigenous businesses. 
However, the absorption by the marketing system of more than 60% of cashew export 
revenue discouraged producers from harvesting cashews, attending to diseases and pest 
control, and increasing crop production. 
V. The liberalization and privatization of the 
cashew industry 
Here we examine private sector response to market reforms: the re-entry of private firms, 
the competitiveness of the industry and factors influencing it, and the ability of indigenous 
firms to compete. Hasty public sector withdrawal from agricultural marketing may, as 
in Zambia's case, lead to adverse effects. Tanzania's gradual replacement of agricultural 
parastatals by private traders appears more plausible. 
The Tanzanian experience indicates the following: 
9 Without high compensation, private traders and truckers are unlikely to buy and haul 
limited produce from remote villages (Mwase, 1983). 
9 Some private input stockists neither stock inputs (creating starved demand) nor repay 
concessional input loans. 
Economic liberalization and privatization have removed various subsidies: production 
(input supplies, e.g., sulphur, blowers); processing (industrial consumables), and 
procurement and marketing (export subsidies). Concessional interest rates and treasury 
guaranteed credit to the cashew industry have ceased. However, the cashew industry 
now has: 
9 foreign exchange subject to local currency cover 
9 input supplies in the hitherto starved local market; 
9 expanded markets as buyers procure cashewnuts at village level. 
With cashew marketing privatized we may witness a return of the days when the 
Asian "trader-cum-transporter-cum-money lender" moved from village to village buying 
produce for resale in and outside the country. In 1992/93 private traders bought 75% of 
cashewnuts in Mtwara region, leaving only 25% for Mtwara Regional Cooperative Union 
(MARCU). Increasingly cashewnuts are sold through private channels. In 1994/95, for 
example, the only cashew buyers in Tunduru and Newala Districts were 40 private traders. 
Of the six cashew producing districts, cooperatives purchased cashew only in Mtwara. 
Local private firms, e.g., Mohamed Enterprises and J.V. Group, and foreign Indian traders 
pay higher producer prices than marketing boards, which have exorbitantly high 
procurement and overhead costs, and excessive bureaucracy and red tape. In 1993/94 
MARCU paid Tshl40 per kg as against Tshl60-220 per kg (Mtwara) and Tsh250-300 
per kg (Tunduru) paid by private traders. 
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As Table 3 shows, in 1994/95 the average farm gate price per kg was Tsh320.00. In 
the 1991/92 season, average price as a percentage of FOB price was 68%. This dropped 
to 43% in the 1992/93 season mainly due to low competition. However, with increased 
competition, it rose to 75% in 1993/94. Instant payments by private traders reduce income 
uncertainties whereas cooperatives/marketing board payments were delayed for one or 
two years with their value eroded by inflation. Privatization of agricultural marketing 
therefore ensures greater smallholder incomes, enhanced welfare and greater supply 
response. 
Privatization of cashew production activities including seedling nurseries and scion 
gardens has changed the cashew industry's "modus operandi". Five of the seven CIP-
run Cashew Development Centres (CDCs) (source of polyclonal seed) have been 
privatized to improve seed supply. Various measures have been instituted to reduce 
benefit accruals to intermediaries (including CBT and cooperative unions) and to boost 
producer prices. Although CIP continues to promote trial seed farms, it is leaving seedling 
nursery development to the private sector. 
Table 3: Farm gate price of raw nuts 19970/71-1994-95 
Year 
Farm gate price 
Tsh/kg 
FGT price 
Tsh/MT 
FOB price 
Tsh/MT 
Farm gate price 
as a % FOB price 
1970/71 0.95 950 1,340 71 
1971/72 0.95 950 1,343 71 
1972/73 0.95 950 1,285 74 
1974/75 0.95 950 1,723 SS 
1975/76 1.05 1,050 1,817 58 
1977/78 1.05 1,050 1,976 53 
1978/89 1.10 1,00 2,511 44 
1979/80 1.15 1,150 3,640 32 
1980/81 1.70 1,700 6,057 46 
1981/82 1.80 1,800 11,469 30 
1982/83 3.00 3,000 7,431 26 
1983/84 5.00 5,000 7,331 67 
1984/85 5.00 5,000 7,331 68 
1985/86 7.00 7,000 13,796 51 
1986/87 9.80 9,800 13,796 71 
1987/88 30.00 30,000 96,599 31 
1988/89 40.00 40,000 111,913 36 
1989/90 84.00 84,000 145,388 58 
1990/91 100.00 110,000 184,691 60 
1991/92 137.00 137,000 202,153 68 
1992/93 145.00 145,000 240,000 43 
1993/94 280.00 280,000 372,000 75 
1994/95 320.00 320,000 492,000 65 
1995/96 300.00 300,000 540,000 56 
Source: Cashewnut Board of Tanzania. 
* up to December 1995. 
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Are we carrying out privatization too speedily and/or too far? Is private sector 
development of seedling nurseries appropriate? Are we being more "purist" than the 
USA, for example, where promotional seedling development is a public sector activity? 
Perhaps we are. The aim is to lessen dependence on public CDCs and research farms, but 
success depends on collaboration between private seed developers and fertilizer firms, 
and public agencies in research and extension services operated for three subsequent 
seasons, with capacity utilization less than 25%. In 1992/93 and 1993/94, with all factories 
closed due to capacity underatilization, raw cashewnuts were exported with loss of value 
added and other processing economies. 
Private exporters now pay government tax previously collected by CBT, before cashew 
is shipped out of Mtwara. Direct crop procurement and export by local and foreign 
traders has fiscal policy implications, particularly given difficulties of monitoring, 
inspecting and checking tax evasion in remote stations. 
Domestic processing should realize value added and other processing economies. 
Construction of the 12 factories was completed by 1982/83 but only 4 were put into 
operation. CBT owns the 12 processing factories, of which 9 are rural-based. Capacity 
underutilization is rampant, with 9 factories virtually unused since their inception. During 
the 1983/84 and 1984/85 seasons only two factories were used. In the following two 
seasons all factories were closed and the entire crop exported in raw form. In 1987/88 
three factories were re-opened to process cashews previously exported raw. In 1994/95 
CBT leased three "grounded" factories to private firms. The CDCs are also being leased 
to NGO/church groups. 
Cashew producer prices increased substantially in the late 1980s following post 1986 
economic liberalization (see Table 4). Weighted average producer prices increased from 
Tshll.58 per kg in 1985/86 to Tshl34.60 per kg in 1991/92. Prices declined by 28% in 
1992/93 partly due to Bank of Tanzania (BOT) pressure on cooperative unions to set low 
producer prices as a pre-condition for crop financing loans. However, prices resumed 
their upward trend, reaching Tsh300-350 per kg in 1994/95. Increased competition 
pushed 1995/96 farm gate prices up by about 40% over 1994/95 prices. Coconut prices 
also rose by approximately 40%-50% and 20%-30% in Tanzania mainland and isles, 
respectively. 
Table 4 shows that producer prices, as a proportion of export prices, were a mere 25% 
-37% in the 1985/86—1988/89 period. This proportion rose and remained at 74% over 
the next two years; it declined to 68% in 1991/92 and 60% in 1992/93 mainly due to low 
competition but rose again to 73% in 1993/94, and to 70%-80% in 1994/95. In real 
terms farm gate prices have been on the increase since the market was liberalized. Table 
5 compares cashew producer prices as a percentage of FOB prices with coffee, cotton 
and flue cured tobacco. Whereas producer prices for these crops (excepting coffee) 
were better than those for cashews in the mid 1980s, cotton and tobacco have not improved 
their relative positions vis-a-vis cashews. 
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Figure 4: Schematic presentation of cashew marketing system under privatization 
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Table 4: Comparison of producer and export prices for cashewnuts in nominal and real terms, 1985/86-1993-94 
SG UG Weighted Export Producer pirce NCPI Deflator Producer Sh/kg 
average price 
(FOB) 
as % of exp 
price 
977=100 1988/89 price export 
Year Sh/kg Sh/kg Sh/kg Sh/kg 100 
1985/86 11.75 8.30 11.58 31.47 37% 716 0.26 44.14 119.99 
1986/87 18.20 12.85 17.93 72.89 25% 948 0.35 51.64 209.90 
1987/88 30.00 20.00 29.50 96.60 31% 1,239 0.45 65.00 212.05 
1988/89 40.00 27.00 39.35 109.86 36% 1,587 0.58 67.60 188.98 
1989/90 84.00 56.00 82.60 111.91 74% 1,984 0.73 113.77 153.99 
1990/91 110.00 73.00 108.15 145.39 74% 2,143 0.78 137.77 185.21 
1991/92 137.00 89.00 134.60 196.95 68% 2,730 1.00 134.60 156.95 
1992/93 125.00 100.00 123.75 202.15 61% 3,424 1.25 98.69 161.18 
1993/94 270.00 110.00 262.00 360.00 72% 4,441 1.63 161.06 221.30 
Source: Calculated from Market Development Bureau, Ministry of Agricultural, Dar-es-Dalaam. 
Weighted average price assuming 95% SG and 5% UG. 
NCPI = National consumer price index 
SG = Standard grade 
UG = Undergrade 
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Table 5: Producer prices as a percentage of FOB prices of cashews and other 
commodities (1985/86-1993/94) 
Cashews Coffee Cotton Tobacco 
(flue cured) 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
37 
25 
31 
36 
74 
74 
73 
61 
75 
74 
48 
58 
38 
82 
64 
97 
46 
48 
166 
111 
52 
39 
29 
36 
58 
42 
40 
119 
57 
60 
46 
34 
45 
60 
32 
61 
Source: Calculated from data from Market Development Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Dar es Salaam 
Cashew prices were based on nut quality (based on district/village of purchase). 
Sometimes nuts were transported to other locations with better prices. Poorer villagers 
in Newala and Tunduru sample villages sometimes sold their meagre crop before the 
buying season for very low prices (e.g., Tsh60 per kg) for cash to cover emergencies or 
for food. 
Cashew trading is dominated by seven principal Asian traders, who finance cashew 
purchase and export. A second group of traders are financially dependent on, and are 
agents of, the principal traders. Their purchases range from a truckload to 4,000 tons 
and are procured at designated buying centres at prices fixed by the principals. A third 
group of unregistered small traders financed by and working for the core traders offer 
premium prices, as they do not pay registration and various other fees. Figure 4 depicts 
the current private sector-dominated cashew marketing system and the inter-group 
linkages. 
In sum, cashew marketing is undertaken through three main channels: 
• big private exporters with hired private traders or cooperatives serving as purchase 
agents; 
• cooperative unions procuring nuts from cooperative societies and then trading on 
their own account; and 
9 . private traders and cooperatives selling to the CMB which in turn exports the raw 
nuts. 
The dominance of cashew marketing by a few big traders curtails competition and 
may foster cartels. In 1991/92, for example, 4 out of 17 Lindi traders (including two 
public sector entities) bought 66% of the crop. Traders' collusion to fix producer prices 
is now a possibility given CBT's inactivity, the marginalization of cooperatives and 
parastatals, and the inaccessibility of credit to indigenous traders following discontinuation 
of the IDA-funded, Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB)-operated, credit 
scheme. Indeed, IDA's 1993/94 small traders' credit of US$100,000 would have bought 
only 140 tons of cashew in 1994/95, too few to influence competition or producer prices. 
Table 6: Conditions for registration of cashew traders in different regions, 1991/92 
Condition Region Coast Dar Tanga Lindi Mtwara Ruvuma Mbeya Iringa 
1) Valid trading license (issued for one season only) x 
2) Procurement at cooperative society x 
3) Pay obligatory levies 
4) Pay for use of society premises x 
5) Submit weekly procurement returns to authorities 
6) Purchase in all districts 
7) Prove ability to pay govt, set prices 
8) Purchases from areas specified by district authorities 
9) Establish contacts with District authorities x 
10) Recover from farmers union education x 
11) Export processed products only 
12) Deliver crops to CBT at negotiated into store price 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Source: Survey data. 
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Lack of significant producer price variations among buying centres and over time is a 
pointer to the lack of competition. 
Big (foreign) traders are less dependent on domestic bank borrowing. For example, 
in 1994/95 India's M/S Saba and Associates committed US$10 million for cashew 
purchases - an amount greater than the aggregate borrowing of four cooperative unions 
and two parastatals in 1993/94. However, to encourage savings for input purchases, 
MALD and CRDB are to establish about 20 rural savings and credit cooperatives in 
Mtwara, Lindi and Ruvuma regions. 
National and local (regional/district) conditions for traders' registration (Table 6) 
include traders' ability to have secure and recognized buying posts, to pay farmers upon 
delivery, and to meet various local cess/fees. CBT and Bank of Tanzania conditions 
include export of only processed nuts and observance of minimum FOB price. 
Registration of private traders is bureaucratic and cumbersome because they are perceived 
as supplementors to, rather than competitors of, public sector marketing channels. 
To ensure sustainability of cashew development research activities, Government has 
decided to integrate CCTP donor-funded research facilities into MALD's research 
structure; to levy a cess on cashew exports to raise cashew research funds; and to encourage 
establishment of regional and district funds to raise additional resources for import of 
inputs. 
VII. Privatization of cashew input supply 
system 
The survey conducted for this study showed that cashew farm age ranged from 7.4 years 
in Masasi to 21.7 years in Lindi; farms have on average 1,565 trees per hectare. The 
relative youth of the farms underlined their establishment during the ujamaa villagization 
policy entailing movement to new areas, with about 49% of interviewees in the six districts 
saying they shifted during the ujamaa collectivization campaigns. The incidence was 
highest for Masasi and Lindi districts, with 60% and 47.5%, respectively. Massive 
replanting/reclaiming of "bush" trees has especially occurred in Lindi. 
There is substantial intercropping of other crops with cashew. In addition to cassava, 
with 85.2% intercropping, and sesame, with 75% intercropping, the incidence of other 
crops is: coconut 30%, millet/sorghum 44%, maize 78.5%, cassava 16.5% and others 
50.6%. Other non-agricultural activities and the extent to which they are undertaken 
include: livestock 45.6%, trade 24.5%, fishing 0.4%, others 17.3% and none 34.6%. 
With cashew harvesting done largely by women (20% of cashew households are 
female-headed) and children, increased cashew production has a gender dimension and 
affects labour utilization and welfare within the household. Assistance to the 
predominantly male-headed households is provided by wives (80.6%), sons (29.1 %), 
daughters (21.19%) and employed labour (57.4%). Employed labour, targeting large 
and medium-scale farming, is likely to grow given the privatization crusade. 
Increased production is perceived by most farmers especially in Newala and Tundura 
as dependent upon sulphur application. In both districts the price of sulphur from private 
traders increased from Tshl2,000 in 1992 to Tsh23,000 in 1994 for a 50 kg bag. The 
corresponding farm gate prices of cashews rose from Tshl40 to Tshl70 and Tsh300. 
Whereas sulphur prices are uniform across villages, the price of cashew is not. The 
concept of "contract dusting" under which a sulphur "stockist" using own blower and 
operator dusts a farmer's trees in exchange for an agreed portion of the crop (about 3.5-
5.5 kg per tree) has declined due to poor repayment experiences. Repayment rates were 
poor for credit or input advances from cooperative union loans in 1991/92 (Mtwara) and 
1992/93 and 1993/94 (Tunduru). 
The confinement of cashew input supply to the crop authority/marketing boards made 
it difficult for farmers to get inputs in time. 
The cashew inputs are sulphur for dusting cashew trees against fungus; blowers; for 
applying the dust; oil and regular petrol for operating the blowers and planting materials 
(grafted seedlings and polyclonal seeds). The liberalization of cashew inputs supply 
started in 1990. The selling of seedlings only started in 1992; previously farmers planted 
their own seedlings. Supply of other inputs was monopolized by private traders due to 
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the huge profits envisaged and inadequate cooperatives' response. Table 7 shows two 
significant developments: the decline and virtual elimination of the public sector in the 
inputs trade, and the substantial price differentials over time and between the private and 
public sector for one input, sulphur. Over 1992-1994 the CIF price of sulphur decreased 
substantially. This could be due to increased competition or continued public sector 
participation, which could have exposed some unfair collusion. It could also be due to 
cooperatives selling cheaply without concern for profits to win popularity. 
Table 7: Cashew inputs: Sulphur Imports and price structure, 1986-1994 
Imports (MT) Unit price CIF price 
Year Tsh/kg US$/ton Importer 
1987 50 MALD 
1988 350 431 - MALD 
1989 402 - - CRDB 
1990 1,500 94 534 TCMB 
1991 1,500 131 534 TCMB 
1,200 144 492 Private traders 
1992 1,250 252 492 Private traders 
1993 1,250 358 369 Private traders 
1994 500 250 330 Co-op. union 
558 273 315 Private traders 
Of 230 farmers interviewed, 134 (58.2%) said that availability of inputs (sulphur and 
blowers) had not improved; 73 (31%) said that there had been some improvements and 
10% said that the situation had worsened. 
Another key input is improved seedlings and seeds attainable through replanting and 
new planting. In the field survey, 56.1% of the farmers had planted new seedlings. Out 
of these, 62.59% used seedlings from their own farms. Others relied on CIP (29.4%), 
private nurseries (2.2%) and other sources (5.9%). This shows that privatization of 
seedling supply is still at a low ebb. One explanation might be that farmers do not see 
seedlings as tradeable goods. 
VII Impact of privatization of the cashew 
industry 
Some positive impact has been realized in increased cashew production and incomes, 
but the situation is not uniform across districts, villages and households. In the sampled 
villages, there is little evidence that resource-poor farmers are selling cashew trees to 
wealthier farmers. In Tunduru, moreover, many households are increasing cashew tree 
ownership by new planting and buying. Tree dusting in Newala has not increased, but i t 
has in Tunduru, especially in the 1992-95 period due to credit availability. Although 
cooperatives' input funds have ensured sulphur availability, they have tended to subsidize 
wealthier farmers at the expense of poorer ones. 
Cashews are the main source of income in the villages studied, with non-cashew 
income generally contributing a higher proportion for less wealthy than for wealthier 
households. Less than 30% of the sampled households earned over Tsh50,000 from 
cashewnut sales in 1993/94. Although few households can purchase items such as bicycles 
(Tsh55,000), an increase in bicycles and radio ownership was identified. The majority 
of households use cashew income for basic needs such as food and clothes, and for 
hospitalization, burials and debt repayments. These basic needs are not easily quantifiable 
to allow comparisons over time. 
In his study on private traders' response to market liberalization, Jaffee (1993) 
established that poor communication, poor roads and taxes/cesses topped the list of 14 
major problems facing cashew traders especially exporters. Although some problems 
including delayed crop payments have been addressed, only 13.1% of the 237 farmers 
interviewed in this study said they had no problems in marketing cashews. On average 
8.4% of farmers complained of too many taxes. As Table 8 shows, other complaints 
(and their magnitude) were: unfair grading of cashew (18.2%); price fluctuations (29.9%); 
excessively low prices (21.2%); and long distances to selling depots (5.7%). 
Table 8 shows that the remote Tunduru and Newala districts faced many problems, 
especially price differentials between different traders. This problem could be addressed 
through grading - standard grade (SG) and undergrade (UG) - with substantial price 
differentials. With demand for cashews outstripping supply in the 1994/95 season, some 
farmers may have sold their cashews without grading. Some traders capitalize on the 
issue of grading to cheat the farmers. 
In general there has been an increase in the producer price at the individual farmer's 
level. But as Table 9 shows there was a wide diversity in average incomes earned by 
individual farmers. Cashew farmers tended to earn more than the national per capita 
income of US$120 or Tsh65,000 (1994). Higher incomes for Newala are attributed to 
the district's favourable cashew growing conditions and its high dependency on cashew 
as the single cash crop. 
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Have higher producer prices/incomes resulted in a matching improvement in the 
welfare of farmers? The field survey showed that the social services had not improved. 
Out of the 237 farmers interviewed, only 9.6% indicated that there had been improvements 
in the social services; 84.7% saw no improvement and 5.7% said the situation had 
deteriorated. This was an overall trend that applied to all districts. 
Table 8: Farmers' problems in selling cashewnuts by districts (%) 
District/ 
Problems Lindi Masasi Mtwara Nachingwea Newala Tunduru Average 
Too many 
taxes 27.4 2 5.9 1.5 0 2.9 8.4 
Unfair 
Grading 13.1 20 17.6 32.4 16.7 2.9 18.2 
Price 
Fluctuations 28.6 30 23.5 33.8 37 20 29.9 
Low prices 8.6 18.3 41.2 19.1 18.5 45.7 21.2 
Long 
Distance 11.9 8.3 0 2.9 1.9 2.9 5.7 
Others 1.2 11.7 0 1.5 5.6 2.9 3.6 
No problem 9.5 10 11.8 8.8 20.4 0 13.1 
Source: Survey data. 
Table 9: Farmers' average incomes, production and price 
District Average production (kg) Average income 
(Tsh) 
1993/94 1994/95 
Lindi 348 404 11,007 
Masasi 1,010 1,008 462,673 
Mtwara 367 383 12,047 
Nachingwea 669 654 205,158 
Newala 3,113 2,327 1,161,377" 
Tunduru 669 664 180,950 
Average 1,029 907 33,852 
Source: Survey data. 
aTwo farmers produced unusually large quantities of cashew, worth Tsh18 million and 
Tsh14 million. 
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Table 10: Farmers' hopes for the future by district 
Future 
hopes Lindi Masasi Mtwara Nachingwea Newala Tunduru Total 
Expansion 30 12 22 30 27 23 144 
of cashew 66.7% 25% 56.4% 50% 64.3% 43.4% 50.2% 
farms 
Diversify to 0 4 1 0 1 2 8 
other crops 0% 8.3% 2.6% 0% 2.4% 3.8% 2.8% 
Availability 
of loans for 2 18 4 0 1 2 26 
cashew 4.4% 37.5% 10.3% 0% 2.4% 3.8% 9.1% 
inputs 
Increase in 
producer 5 1 1 11 5 10 33 
prices 15.6% 10.4 2.6% 18.3% 11 .9% 18.9% 16% 
Not 2 1 0 8 0 13 
applicable 4.4% 2.1% 0% 13.3% 0% 4.5% 13 
Source: Survey data. 
Smallholder producers spent their increased incomes on household needs, housing, 
education and reinvestment in their cashew farms. Large farmers, especially in Newala, 
used their substantial cashew revenue to open retail shops and to construct water reservoirs 
for rainwater harvesting. As Table 10 shows, there is renewed enthusiasm for the future 
of the crop, as most farmers (70.1%) plan to plant new cashew seedlings, to dust and to 
increase hectarage. Of this, 19.9% plan to plant new improved seedlings. Only 2.8% of 
the farmers interviewed intend to diversify to other crops. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The liberalization and privatization of agricultural marketing is a major U-turn for 
Tanzania. Since the 1940s cashew producers bought inputs from, and sold cashew to, 
cooperatives, marketing boards and regional transport companies. Private traders did 
not never officially participate in village cashew input or output markets. 
The cashew industry in the 1970s and 1980s was in the doldrums, with production 
down by 89% and 12 processing factories closed. This was attributed to unfavourable 
pricing, marketing and processing policies; agricultural collectivization in the 1970s; 
and the incidence of fungal disease. However, the positive aspects of structural adjustment, 
including easier access to foreign exchange and inputs and privatization of inputs, 
purchase, processing and export of cashews, have enhanced competition, increased 
producer prices and prompt payment of farmers. This has led to expanded hectarage and 
rehabilitation of cashew trees, which has reversed the decline in production. Privatization 
and rehabilitation of factories and pre-export processing of cashews should increase 
value added. 
Privatization has reduced the role of the CBT and the cooperatives, now operating as 
agents of and buying depots for private traders. Further refining and streamlining of 
their roles and functions should reduce costly duplication. Despite privatization of input 
supply and disbursement of credit on concessional terms to private input stockists, 
adequate inputs (e.g., sulphur and blowers) are yet to be stocked. Although the new 
system has some problems, the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. 
Even though the state has withdrawn from active involvement in cashew production 
and marketing, it can facilitate these activities by removing remaining constraints to 
private sector entry; encouraging formation of small-scale seed companies by "progressive 
farmers" or the informal sector; removing remaining restrictions to getting cashew input 
permits; publicizing and encouraging private trader procurement and sale of cashew 
inputs and outputs; establishing a comprehensive market information system available 
to all players; and reviewing the role of CBT and cooperatives to ensure a level playing 
field for the private sector. 
Prices should be market-determined, with cooperatives and marketing boards acting 
as a "buyer of last resort" to ensure purchase of cashews from remote rural areas shunned 
by private traders. The challenge is to develop a liberal, privatized and sustainable cashew 
marketing system that is responsive to producers' needs and expectations. 
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Appendix A: Cashewnut production by 
region/district 
1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 
Mtwara Reaion 
Mtwara 1,793 1,184 1,169 2,684 4,531 4,950 3,039 
Newala 7,457 7,621 4,429 7,885 11,985 7,033 10,901 
Masasi 3,173 2,203 2,950 2,783 5,609 5,660 7,894 
Total 12,423 11,008 8,548 14,3S2 22,125 17,943 21,834 
Lindi Region 
Lindi 1,191 507 856 1,614 3,399 4,800 2,711 
Nachingwea 436 289 135 451 1,344 1,764 2,356 
Liwale 227 622 54 374 654 654 675 
Kilwa 738 196 250 660 516 206 202 
Total 2,592 1,614 1,295 3,099 5,913 7,435 5,944 
Tunduru Reaion 
Tunduru 550 1,354 319 1,336 2,854 5,165 4,981 
Total 550 1,354 319 1,336 2,854 5,165 4,981 
Coast Reaion 
Kisarawe 3,676 1,095 1,933 2,486 2,129 n/a 3,408 
Kibaha 205 481 936 2,066 1,021 n/a 3,370 
Bagamoyo 624 182 201 415 633 n/a 461 
Rufiji 555 317 313 697 319 n/a 229 
Mafia 69 74 157 59 61 n/a 0 
Total 5,129 2,149 3,540 5,163 4,165 n/a 7,468 
Tanga Reqion 
Tanga 302 97 243 n/a 450 2,333 1,928 
Muheza 954 203 1142 n/a 1,340 871 70 
Pangani 360 276 416 n/a 313 1,016 150 
Korogwe 132 40 33 n/a 136 180 0 
Handeni 33 6 3 n/a 7 55 0 
Total 1,781 622 1,837 1,622 2,246 0 2,148 
Dar es Salaam Reaion 
llala 400 107 86 154 134 n/a 310 
Temeke 986 2295 1772 2626 3646 n/a 3237 
Kinondoni 300 0 12 SO 60 n/a 29 
Total 1,686 22 1,870 2,830 3,840 4,131 3,576 
Mbeya/lrinaa Reaiona 
Kyela 165 106 94 209 97 176 296 
Ludewa I 1 7 2 12 0 0 15 
Others 0 8 0 0 0 18 IS 
Grand Total 22,337 19,270 17,505 29,183 41,238 39,323 46,603 
Source: Cashew improvement programme, Dar es Salaam 
Appendix B: Exports of raw nuts, kernels, 
cashewnut shell liquid and 
cashew powder, 1985-94 
Year Raw nuts Kernels Cashew shell liquid Cashew powder 
1985 13,853 518 1,199 15 
1986 13,379 0 315 Nil 
1987 13,871 0 - -
1988 14,004 1,014 Nil Nil 
1989 7,485 1,711 Nil Nil 
1990 7,429 1,412 577 Nil 
1991 19,000 956 1,056 Nil 
1992 18,456 1,027 564 Nil 
1993 39,323 Nil Nil Nil 
1994 46,598 Nil Nil Nil 
Source: Market Development Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Dar es Salaam 
Appendix C: District council cesses levies on cashewnut sales, 
1994/95 (sh/kg) 
Types of Council Council Input School Primary Desks Weighing Tore fund- Sport Other/6 Total 
levy levy devt. levy/3 fund society fund scale Gation levy levy 
Newala 7.5 5 30 8 NL NL NL NL NL /c 54.50 
Masasi 3 5 10 5 4.10 2 1 0.5 0.2 NA 30.60 
Mtwara 5 NL 10 5 4.10 2.7 1 0.5 6 NL 33.50 
Lindi 3 5 10 5 4.10 2 0.5 0.5 NL NL 29.60 
Bagamoyo 5 NL 20 3 12.00 5 NL NL NL 18/d 63.00 
Rufiji 10 NL NL NL NL NL NL NL NL NL 13.00 
Kisarawe 10 10 20 2 15 NL NL NL NL NL NA 
Tanga NA NA 5 5 NA NA NA NA NL NA NA 
Muheza 1 NL NL NL NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Pangani 5 NL NL NL NL NL NA NL NL NL 9 
5 NL NL NL NL NL NL NL NL NL 6 
Source: Research by author. 
"For crop development fund 
bVillage, stadium, road maintenance, etc. 
cStadium levy 
dRoad maintenance levy 
NL = Not levied 
NA = Not available 
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